Fundamental Moments by Imbs, Jean & Pauwels, Laurent
The University of Sydney Business School 
The University of Sydney 
 
 
 
BUSINESS ANALYTICS WORKING PAPER SERIES 
  
 
Fundamental Moments 
 
 
Jean Imbs                             Laurent L. Pauwels 
NYU Abu Dhabi                    The University of Sydney 
             PSE (CNRS), CEPR 
 
 
April 10, 2019 
 
 
Abstract: 
Global trade can give rise to global hubs, centers of activity whose influence on 
the global economy is large enough that local disturbances have consequences 
in the aggregate. This paper investigates the nature, existence, and rise of such 
hubs using the World Input-Output Tables (WIOT) to evaluate the importance of 
vertical trade in creating global hubs that significantly affect countries volatility 
and their co-movement. Our results suggest that the world has become more 
granular since 1995, with significant consequences on GDP volatility and co-
movements especially in developed countries. These consequences are well 
explained by international trade. 
 
Keywords: Aggregate volatility, GDP synchronization, global hubs, input-output 
linkages, World Input-Output Tables 
 
JEL Classification: E32, F44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
May 2019 
 
BA Working Paper No: BAWP-2019-06 
http://sydney.edu.au/business/business_analytics/research/working_papers  
Fundamental Moments∗
Jean Imbs
NYU Abu Dhabi
PSE (CNRS), CEPR
Laurent L. Pauwels
The University of Sydney
April 10, 2019
Abstract
Global trade can give rise to global hubs, centers of activity whose influence on
the global economy is large enough that local disturbances have consequences in
the aggregate. This paper investigates the nature, existence, and rise of such hubs
using the World Input-Output Tables (WIOT) to evaluate the importance of ver-
tical trade in creating global hubs that significantly affect countries volatility and
their co-movement. Our results suggest that the world has become more granular
since 1995, with significant consequences on GDP volatility and co-movements
especially in developed countries. These consequences are well explained by in-
ternational trade.
Keywords: Aggregate volatility, GDP synchronization, global hubs, input-output
linkages, World Input-Output Tables.
JEL Codes: E32, F44
1 Introduction
Microeconomic shocks have effects in the aggregate if the economy is populated by
large firms or large sector, a property Gabaix (2011) calls “granularity”. Then the law
of large numbers does not hold in its strong form. The distribution of activity itself is
an endogenous manifestation of vertical linkages as summarized by input-output tables.
With the advent of global supply chains over the past decades, it is plausible that the
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patterns of specialization have altered significantly, at regional and global levels, giving
rise to global hubs. If aggregate fluctuations have granular origins, then international
trade is likely to affect aggregate moments at country, regional, and global levels, by
changing the fundamental structure of the world economy. Here we investigate this
possibility empirically.
We have known since Hulten (1978) that under some assumptions aggregate fluctu-
ations can be represented by a weighted average of microeconomic shocks, for instance
at sector level. The weights can be interpreted as the influence of each sector (Acemoglu
et al., 2012), and influence vectors are in turn directly implied by input-output linkages,
both purely domestic and across countries. We compute these influence vectors for all
40 countries covered by world input-output tables (WIOT) between 1995 and 2014.
This provides a granular decomposition of aggregate fluctuations for most of the world
economy. We verify whether the second moments of GDP in the panel formed by these
countries correlate significantly with their fundamental (granular) determinants, implied
by global input-output linkages. We focus on two of the most scrutinized moments of
GDP fluctuations: their volatility and their international synchronization.
The main appeal of a granular decomposition of aggregate fluctuations grounded on
WIOT is that the respective roles of domestic and international input-output linkages
can readily be identified. WIOT comprises national input-output tables that form its
block diagonale, to which international vertical linkages are appended for each pair of
countries. Relative to conventional national tables, WIOT decomposes total trade for
each country into the flows with each of its individual partner: All the exports from
country c are broken down by country of destination, and all of its imports are broken
down by country of origin.1 Thus, it is possible to place every single country (or sec-
tor) in world trade provided it has coverage in WIOT. This opens the door for three
interesting decompositions.
First, one can decompose WIOT into two matrices: one that embed only purely do-
mestic input-output linkages, and one that focuses on international vertical trade. With
this decomposition, one can assess whether the fundamental determinants of volatility
and co-movements are associated with international trade. This decomposition does not
purport to construct a counterfactual exercise characterizing what would have happened
absent the rise in vertical trade. Rather, the exercise is performed as a decomposition,
taking the patterns of trade as given by WIOT, i.e. implicitly given by a global distri-
bution of productivities and trade costs. The patterns of trade observed in WIOT imply
a worldwide distribution of influence vectors. And the influence vectors can, in turn,
1This of course does not go without simplifications. See for instance Dietzenbacher et al. (2013) for a
detailed discussion of the construction of WIOT.
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be decomposed into a domestic and an international component, which each map into
aggregate volatility and co-movement.
Second, one can readily generate decompositions of WIOT omitting individual sec-
tors. This exercise isolates the impact of a given activity on fundamental moments
globally. Armed with such selected versions of WIOT, we evaluate empirically the
consequences on volatility and co–movements of the existence and emergence of large
sectors.
Third, one can focus on sub-sets of WIOT, characterized by large trade flows, where
the intensity of vertical linkages is liable to create local hubs with sizeable consequence
at the regional level. For instance did the deep economic integration within the European
Union stimulate the emergence of local hubs? And did the developing world become
more granular with the offshoring of manufacturing activities to China?2
The data paint a picture of increased granularity in the world economy, that seems
largely due to international trade. The phenomenon is strongest in advanced economies,
especially the European Union. Increased granularity translates in increased volatility
of GDP: We find a large role for the fundamental explanations of aggregate volatility,
at least on par with other conventional regressors. International trade, through its effect
on granularity, increases aggregate volatility in the full sample of 40 countries. The
result is most pronounced in rich countries, and corresponds to the emergence of a large
financial and real estate sector, which has prevailed since the 2000’s.
We also find a significant role for fundamental explanations of aggregate co-movements:
Countries cycles are more synchronized when the same hubs exist in both economies.
This is once again mostly true in advanced economies, but it is not exclusively explained
by international trade. The fundamental drivers of co-movements have emerged in the
2000’s, and they have intensified with the Great Financial Crisis of 2008. Once again,
we find financial service and real estate to be a significant driver of this result.3
The possibility that microeconomic shocks have aggregate effects is not new ( Jo-
vanovic, 1987, Long and Plosser, 1987), but it has recently gone through a revival.
Gabaix (2011) shows micro shocks can have aggregate effects in an economy populated
by large firms or sectors. The intuition builds from Hulten (1978) who shows aggregate
fluctuations can be decomposed into a weighted average of micro shocks, with weights
2These are not counter-factual exercises. Modifying the patterns of trade - increasing trade costs in
one country, one sector, or one region - would have general equilibrium consequences on WIOT. Bosker
and Westbrock (2015) propose counterfactual exercises about the welfare effects of changed trade costs
in the world economy.
3No individual country is at the root of these results. We experimented on versions of WIOT from
which the US, China, Germany, or other large advanced economies were omitted, but no results were
altered significantly. We also experimented with subsets of countries, e.g. omitting Germany or the UK
from the European Union, or China from developing economies. No results were significantly changed.
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given by gross output shares (the “Domar” weights). When Domar weights are dis-
tributed with fat tails, micro shocks do not average out in the aggregate. Carvalho and
Gabaix (2013) show the great moderation of the 1980’s can be ascribed to a fall in the
share of manufacturing in the US, while its undoing is due to the emergence of the fi-
nancial sector. They confirm US aggregate volatility has sizeable fundamental origins.
Our paper picks up from theirs, extending their analysis to more countries, and more
aggregate moments.
Our approach allows for granularity to emerge from vertical trade. We closely fol-
low Acemoglu et al. (2012) who construct a model in the spirit of Long and Plosser
(1987) in which large sectors emerge because they are central in the network formed
by input-output linkages. The Domar weights are then given by the influence vectors,
capturing the existence and magnitude of hubs. Acemoglu et al. (2017) shows extreme
events can occur in the aggregate simply because central sectors are exposed to fat-tailed
idiosyncratic shocks. Using firm-level data, Bernard et al. (2019) document that the het-
erogeneity in Belgian firms can be ascribed to their place in the network of input-output
linkages.
The literature has developed in three directions all introducing amendment to the
classic Hulten result. First, with firm entry and exit, micro-dynamics can affect aggre-
gate fluctuations through a different mechanism than Hulten’s. The argument goes back
to Hopenhayn (1992) and was more recently analyzed by Bilbiie et al. (2012), Clementi
and Palazzo (2016), or Carvalho and Grassi (2019). Our paper works with sector-level
data, and so abstracts from the extensive margin at firm level. Second, if micro shocks
propagate throughout the economy, the simple Hulten arithmetic can be modified. Ace-
moglu et al. (2016) consider the propagation of shocks via input-output linkages. Car-
valho et al. (2017) and Boehm et al. (2016) trace the global effects of shocks caused
by natural disasters. Foerster et al. (2011) and Atalay (2017) control for propagation to
identify separately “truly” idiosyncratic sector-level shocks. Our paper applies the Hul-
ten arithmetic to sector-level shocks, which may or may not embed propagation mecha-
nisms. In other words, we do not purport to identify “true” sector level disturbances: we
take them as given and investigate their impact in the aggregate.4 Third, Hulten’s result
requires efficient markets. With imperfections, Hulten’s decomposition is augmented
with second order effects. These can have large consequences, like in Baqaee (2018),
Grassi (2018), or Bigio and La’O (2016). Baqaee and Farhi (2017) show how the Hul-
ten decomposition must be amended to account for imperfections and inefficiencies in a
general framework. Our paper focuses on first-order effects, if only because we follow
4In a companion paper, we propose a methodology to control for propagation mechanisms in a cross-
country framework.
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Acemoglu et al. (2012) and impose Cobb-Douglas production.
The question whether trade has consequences on aggregate moments is the object of
a large literature. Johnson (2014) calibrates a model with final and intermediate goods
trade to assess how the introduction of input-output linkages alter the trade-comovement
puzzle. di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009) show sectors that are open to trade tend
to display high volatility, which in turn affects aggregate volatility. di Giovanni and
Levchenko (2010) show vertical trade between pairs of sectors tends to increase their
co-movements, which in turn also affects aggregate co-movements. di Giovanni and
Levchenko (2013) argue international trade increases the prevalence of fat tails in firm
distributions, which in turn increases aggregate volatility. di Giovanni et al. (2014)
argue firm-specific shocks affect aggregate volatility in France, because of fat-tailed
firm distribution, and of domestic input-output linkages. di Giovanni et al. (2018) show
French firms that trade with a country tend to co-move with the cycle there, which acts
to increase significantly aggregate co-movements.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our approach.
Section 3 presents the results on volatility, on co-movements, and some robustness.
Section 4 concludes.
2 Methodology
2.1 Empirical Implementation
Following Hulten (1978), Acemoglu et al (2012) show that, under perfect competition
and Cobb Douglas production, aggregate fluctuations yt can be written as a weighted
average of micro-economic shocks, given by:
yt =
n∑
i=1
αiνitεit (1)
where i indexes sectors, εit is a sector specific shock, αi is the share of labor in sector
i, and νit is the typical element of the influence vector νt. Acemoglu et al. (2012) show
the influence vector is defined by
ν
′
t = β
′ [I− (I−A)Wt]−1
where I is the identity matrix, β is a vector of sector-level final expenditure shares, A is
a diagonal matrix of sector-level labor shares, and Wt reflects each economy’s trade in
intermediate goods. As such, Wt denotes each country’s national input-output matrix,
augmented with all elements in WIOT that capture the trade linkages of each country
with the rest of the world. The decomposition of aggregate fluctuations necessitates
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therefore estimates of factor shares, expenditure shares, and empirical values for (I −
A)Wt.
Information about (I−A)Wt is directly available from WIOT, which reports pjxij ,
the value of inputs from sector j used in the production of good i. Optimal choice of
inputs guarantees that pjxij = (1− αi) piwijxi, where wij is a typical element of Wt.
Therefore,
wij =
1
1− αi
pjxij
pixi
.
In other words, wij is given by a normalized version of WIOT, where the normalization
is given by (1− αi) pixi. By definition, a direct requirement matrix can be obtained
by the normalization of the input-output matrix by total industry output, see Dietzen-
bacher et al. (2013). The typical element of a direct requirement matrix is therefore
given by pjxij
pixi
. It follows immediately that the typical element of the direct require-
ment matrix reported in WIOT can be written as (1− αi)wij . And thus it follows that
(I−A)Wt is exactly the direct requirement matrix reported in WIOT, with typical ele-
ment (1− αi)wij . The direct requirement matrix in WIOT is therefore all that is needed
to compute each industry’s influence vector, across all countries.5
The factor shares αi across sectors are directly obtained for each country from the
direct requirement matrix in WIOT, using the definition
1− αi =
∑
j
pjxij
pixi
.
Finally, the expenditure shares on final goods βi can be computed directly from WIOT
as the sum of exports and domestic absorption net of final imports, expressed as a ratio
of total value added in each sector i.6
2.2 The Role of Trade
Equation (1) defines an elasticity of GDP to sector-specific shocks that depends on
the structure of vertical trade. Given the international structure of WIOT, it is possi-
ble to decompose the influence vectors into a part that corresponds to purely domestic
input-output linkages, and one that reflects the international dimension of vertical trade.
In particular, define WDOMt as the block diagonale matrix formed by the domestic com-
ponents of national input-output tables in WIOT, and WINTt all the off-diagonale terms
that reflect international vertical trade. Since Wt = WDOMt + W
INT
t , the influence
5Here we differ from Acemoglu et al. (2012), who impose αi = α, and need an empirical counterpart
toWt. They obtain it by normalizing each entry in the US direct requirement matrix by
∑
j pjxij , i.e.,
each column-wise sum.
6In practice, the final expenditure shares are computed using gross value added given in WIOT, and
using Leontief’s decomposition when needed. See Section 2.3.
6
vector is given by
ν
′
t = β
′
[
I− (I−A)WDOMt − (I−A)WINTt
]−1
= β′
[
I− (I−A)WDOMt
]−1
+ ν
′
t
[
(I−A)WINTt
] [
I− (I−A)WDOMt
]−1
.
In addition, the final expenditure shares can be decomposed into a purely domestic
term, and one focused on exports: βi = βDOMi +β
INT
i , with β
DOM
i domestic expenditures
on domestic final good i, and βINTi foreign expenditures on domestic final good. And
the influence vector decomposes naturally into
ν
′
t = ν
DOM
t
′
+ νINTt
′
,
where νDOMt
′
= βDOM
′ [
I− (I−A)WDOMt
]−1 reflects the purely domestic compo-
nent of the influence, and
νINTt
′
= βINT
′ [
I− (I−A)WDOMt
]−1
+ ν ′t
[
(I−A)WINTt
] [
I− (I−A)WDOMt
]−1
embeds the role of international trade, both in intermediate and final goods.
By definition, aggregate fluctuations are given by
yt =
n∑
i=1
αiν
DOM
it εit +
n∑
i=1
αiν
INT
it εit (2)
which identifies the sources of granular aggregate fluctuations that arise from purely
domestic linkages, and those that are caused by international trade.
2.3 The Role of Hubs
The previous exercise performs a decomposition of WIOT that makes no use of its
bilateral dimension. More refined decompositions are possible: we now select out the
trade linkages associated with individual countries, regions, or sectors rather than trade
as a whole.
We first compute the influence vector
ν ′t
−r
= β′
[
I− (I−A)Wt−r
]−1
,
where Wt−r denotes the world input-output matrix where all cells involving country r
are omitted. The influence vector ν ′t
−r implies a decomposition of aggregate fluctua-
tions that corresponds to world input-output linkages abstracting from country r. Com-
paring the decomposition of aggregate fluctuations implied by ν ′t versus ν
′
t
−r quantifies
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the contribution of country r in the emergence of a global hub, with potential conse-
quences on aggregate moments. The same exercise can be performed among sub-sets
of countries, formed for instance by regional trade agreements, and the importance of a
specific country in each region can then be assessed analogously.
The same logic can be used to assess the importance of a given sector for aggregate
fluctuations. Define the influence vector
ν ′t
−i
= β′
[
I− (I−A)Wt−i
]−1
,
where Wt−i denotes the world intput-output matrix where all cells involving sector i are
omitted. The vector ν ′t
−i implies a decomposition of aggregate fluctuations abstracting
from sector i. A comparison between ν ′t and ν
′
t
−i helps quantify the role of sector i as
a global hub. Once again, this decomposition can be performed globally, or for sub-sets
of countries, for instance constituting regional trade areas.
Both manipulations imply changed values for factor shares, expenditure shares,
value added, and intermediate use. To incorporate these changes in our evaluations
of alternative influence vectors ν ′t
−r or ν ′t
−i, we identify the mapping between input-
output linkages and sector-level value added yit. This mapping, due to Leontief (1936),
is a simple identity that writes:
yit = Vit TRit FDit
where Vit = yitsit is the so-called value added coefficient, sit denotes gross output in sector
i, TRit denotes the typical element of the total requirement matrix
[
I−Wt(I−A)
]−1,
and FDit is the typical element of final demand in sector i, given by
[
I−Wt(I−A)
]
st.
Leontief’s decomposition can be expressed in matrix algebrae, with self-explanatory
notation:
Yt = Vt TRt FDt
whereVt is a diagonal matrix populated with the value added coefficients yitsit . Leontief’s
decomposition gives the estimates of sector and country sources of value added for each
sector’s final good production. For given values ofWt, along with the associated values
of A and β, Leontief’s decomposition computes value added at sector-level yit.
Now when we replace Wt with Wt−r or Wt−i, the change evidently affects di-
rectly the definition of the direct requirement matrix Wt. Simultaneously, it also modi-
fies the matrix of value added Yt, for given observed gross output st. These two modi-
fications jointly define changed values for Yt, A, β, and ultimately the influence vector
ν ′t.
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3 Empirics
3.1 A first look at the data
Gabaix (2011) and Acemoglu et al. (2012) show that, if the empirical distribution of
activity can be approximated by a power law with tail parameter η ∈ (1, 2), then aggre-
gate volatility decays at a rate slower than n−2(η−1)/η, where n is the number of sectors.
The smaller the estimates of the tail η, the lower the rate of decay in aggregate moments
as n increases. Put differently, the lower η, the more we are likely to find a systematic
relation between the second moments of GDP and the specialization of the economy, as
captured by the influence vector. As a first description of the data, we now present some
tail estimates of these distributions across the economies covered by WIOT.
A conventional procedure to estimate the tails of a distribution is due to Clauset et al.
(2009), which also provides an estimation of the threshold value xmin above which x
follows a power distribution. The value of this threshold is important, for the estimation
focuses on observations above it. For small values of n, an issue of finite sample bias
is frequent in this procedure, resulting in an unduly high estimate of xmin. This in turn
results in tail parameters being estimated on few observations. Clauset et al. (2009)
recommends truncating the search over xmin to relatively low values, which introduces
a degree of arbitrariness in the resulting estimates. The approach is not palatable for
small samples with n < 50.7
Here we follow instead Pesaran and Yang (2016), who introduce an estimator di-
rectly applicable to the production network structure in WIOT. The approach uses the
distribution of outdegrees di, defined as the share of a sector’s output used as interme-
diate input by all other sectors in the economy. The outdegree of each sector is simply
given by the column-wise sum of the entries in Wt. Pesaran and Yang (2016) introduce
the notion of dominance 0 ≤ δi ≤ 1, defined as the speed at which the outdegree in
sector i increases with n:
di = κn
δi
with κ a constant independent of n. Absent any dominant sector, δi = 0 for all i; strong
dominance implies δi = 1, and values between 0 and 1 imply weak dominance. For
microeconomic shocks to have aggregate effects at least one sector i must be dominant
with at least δi > 1/2. In fact, Pesaran and Yang (2016) show that the limiting behavior
of ν ′tνt, i.e. fundamental aggregate variance, is determined by n
2(δmax−1), where δmax =
max(δ1, . . . , δn). The effects of sector-specific shocks on aggregate volatility only exist
7An alternative is a regression of the (log) rank on the (log) size of microeonomic units. This approach
can also suffer from a small sample bias, as discussed in Gabaix and Ibragimov (2011), which disqualifies
it for the present purpose. Log-rank regressions also famously have low power in rejecting power law
distributions.
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in finite sample for δmax > 1/2.8 Pesaran and Yang (2016) show formally that δmax
maps into the (inverse of the) shape parameter η of the power law distribution of the
production network, so that an estimate of δmax characterizes the power law.
It is possible to estimate δmax non-parametrically. For each sector, we have
log di = log κ+ δi log n+ εi.
Summing across sectors, this implies that
log κ =
1
n
∑
i
log di,
since logn
n
∑
i δi and
1
n
∑
i εi both tend to 0 in the limit. It follows that
δmax =
log dmax − 1n
∑
i log di
log n
which provides an estimate of δmax given directly observable outdegrees di and their
maximum value dmax. Since the tail of the distribution η is given by the inverse of δmax,
this characterizes the distribution.
To gain in precision, we implement the estimation over panel data, as recommended
by Pesaran and Yang (2016) in small samples. We separate the available sample into
two periods around the Great Recession of 2007/2008, first from 1995 to 2007, and then
from 2008 to 2014. Standard errors for δmax are computed following Section 7.2.1 and
7.2.2 in Pesaran and Yang (2016) and the standard error of η is obtained using the Delta
method. The non-parametric approach also makes it possible to identify all dominant
units in WIOT, and in particular to document what sectors are dominant and whether
their identities have changed over time.
WIOT covers 40 developed and developing countries, and provides annual data from
1995 to 2014.9 The covered countries account for approximately 85% of world GDP.
The input-output data are available for 31 industries for each country and each year. The
data is in millions of U.S. dollars at current prices. Dietzenbacher et al. (2013) details
the methodology used to construct these data.10
We estimate η for four large economies and for relevant groupings of countries such
8And they only survive for n→∞ if there is at least one strongly dominant sector.
9See http://www.wiod.org/database/iot.html
10We merge two releases of WIOT. The 2013 release contains input-output data for 40 countries and
35 industries (ISIC Rev. 3) spanning from 1995 – 2011. The 2016 release contains 43 countries and 56
industries (ISIC Rev. 4) spanning from 2000 – 2014. We use the 2013 release from 1995 – 1999 and the
2016 release from 2000 – 2014. We match all industries according to the ISIC Rev. 3 definitions which
results in 31 industries and 40 countries.
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as the European Union. We also provide estimates for the whole world, and for versions
that omit the US or China. To do so, we aggregate all the relevant elements in WIOT
across countries: we select the elements in WIOT that summarize each country’s pro-
duction and exports in each sector, and sum them across all relevant countries. Given
this synthetic aggregate matrix, we compute the outdegrees and their maximum val-
ues. Finally, we identify the impact of international trade by aggregating the elements
of WIOT that pertain to purely domestic production in each sector across all relevant
countries, and compute the outdegrees accordingly.
Table 1 reports our estimates for the whole period from 1995 to 2014, and pre /
post-2008. The left panel uses all the elements in WIOT, the right panel focuses on
the entries corresponding to purely domestic input trade. Worldwide estimates of η are
1.925 over the full period, and displays a slight increase over the period, from 1.917 to
1.939, suggesting the world diversifies slightly. This result survives if one abstracts from
the US, but it is reversed if it is China that is omitted. In other words, it is because of the
emergence of China in the global economy that the world has become more diversified:
Even though large sectors are emerging in China, they are sufficiently specific to China
that the world is diversifying. We can see this from Table A1 in the appendix, where we
list the three most pervasive sectors for each region and country, as defined by the three
largest values of δi. The dominant sectors in China (in the sense of δmax) are equipment
goods, chemicals, and agriculture. But the dominant sectors globally are “Renting and
Other Business Services” and financial intermediation.11, 12
Table 1’s lower panel presents estimates for individual countries and the Euro-
pean Union (EU). Over the full period, Germany is the most specialized economy
(η = 1.447), followed by the US (η = 1.488), China (η = 1.575), and the EU
(η = 1.646). But these countries are on diverging trends: China is strongly diversi-
fying its economy over the period, η increasing from 1.510 to 1.710 since 1995. The US
and the EU are going the other way, with estimates of η that are actually significantly
lower than China’s over the most recent period 2008-2014. This is likely reflecting
the industrialisation of a country initially specialized in agricultural production, and the
de-industrialization of countries producing mostly in services. The data in Table A1
support this interpretation: China’s dominant sectors included agriculture betwen 1995
and 2007, but that was replaced by petrol after 2008. The EU’s dominant sectors in-
cluded equipment goods between 1995 and 2007, but that was replaced by utilities after
2008.
11“Renting and Other Business Services” is short for Renting of Machinery & Equipment and Other
Business Services industry, K71 to K74 of the ISIC Rev. 3. )
12This is akin to what Grazzini and Spelta (2015) document: peripheral sectors in 1995 became impor-
tant by 2011.
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Table 1: Tail estimations (η)
With Trade Without Trade
Country/Region 95 – 14 95 – 07 08 – 14 95 – 14 95 – 07 08 – 14
World 1.925 1.917 1.939 1.886 1.875 1.907
(0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06) (0.02)
World w/o USA 2.109 2.098 2.129 2.059 2.040 2.094
(0.06) (0.09) (0.02) (0.06) (0.08) (0.03)
World w/o China 1.835 1.854 1.800 1.785 1.805 1.750
(0.04) (0.06) (0.01) (0.04) (0.06) (0.01)
Germany 1.447 1.436 1.469 1.518 1.511 1.531
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
USA 1.488 1.512 1.443 1.473 1.501 1.424
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
China 1.575 1.510 1.710 2.205 2.067 2.415
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.13) (0.15) (0.06)
EU15 1.646 1.675 1.595 1.583 1.607 1.540
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Notes: The tail estimates of η are the inverse of the estimator of δmax proposed
by Pesaran and Yang (2016). The approach is based on the distribution of the
outdegree of sectors. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Germany constitutes an exception here, as its specialization fell slightly (but sig-
nificantly), presumably because Germany did not de-industrialize much in the recent
period. In fact, Germany’s dominant sectors remain unchanged over the period: includ-
ing Renting and Other Business Services, equipment goods, and transportation services.
How much of these trends are related with international trade? The right panel of
Table 1 begins to answer this question with estimates of η abstracting from trade. First,
China is estimated to be much more diversified abstracting from trade with estimates
of η significantly above 2.13 China, however, is still estimated to diversify from 1995
to 2014 even in the absence of international trade. The same can be said of Germany,
although the magnitudes are much smaller: without trade Germany appears more di-
versified, and specializes slightly but not significantly. The EU displays the opposite
pattern: without trade, the region is more specialized (1.583 vs. 1.646), and it spe-
cializes over time. The trends in the US are similar but not significant. Table A2 in the
Appendix reports tail estimates for all 40 countries in the sample. The same conclusions
emerge: the average country specializes, and it tends to happen because of international
trade.
The elasticity of aggregate fluctuations to sector-level shocks is given by each ele-
ment of the influence vector νit. For asymmetric distributions of νit, sector-level distur-
bances will not cancel out in the aggregate: It is of independent interest to document the
13In fact, aggregate moments do not exist for η > 2. It is reassuring that such estimates only arise in
artificial constructs, abstracting from trade, or from a country.
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empirical distributions of influence by sector. Figures 1 to 3 do so, first for the world
economy as a whole, and then for three large economies, Germany, the US, and China.
Each figure reports the initial distribution estimates in 1995, the change in each sec-
tor’s influence between 1995 and 2014, and the estimates corresponding to a version of
WIOT focused on domestic trade only.
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(a) World in 1995
Ag
ric
ul
t
M
in
in
g
Fo
od
Te
xt
ile
 a
nd
 L
ea
th
er
W
oo
d
Pa
pe
r
Pe
tro
l
Ch
em
ica
ls
Pl
as
tic
s
M
in
er
al
s
M
et
al
s
Eq
ui
pm
en
ts
El
ec
t.
Co
ns
tr.
M
ot
or
W
ho
le
sa
le
R
et
ai
l
H
ot
el
In
la
nd
 T
ra
ns
.
W
at
er
 T
ra
ns
.
Ai
r T
ra
ns
.
Tr
an
s 
se
rv
.
Te
le
co
m
Fi
n 
In
te
rm
ed
R
ea
l E
st
.
R
en
tin
g 
& 
O
th
er
 B
us
Ad
m
in
Ed
uc
H
ea
lth
So
cia
l
Pr
iv
at
e
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
(b) Change from 1995 to 2014
Ag
ric
ul
t
M
in
in
g
Fo
od
Te
xt
ile
 a
nd
 L
ea
th
er
W
oo
d
Pa
pe
r
Pe
tro
l
Ch
em
ica
ls
Pl
as
tic
s
M
in
er
al
s
M
et
al
s
Eq
ui
pm
en
ts
El
ec
t.
Co
ns
tr.
M
ot
or
W
ho
le
sa
le
R
et
ai
l
H
ot
el
In
la
nd
 T
ra
ns
.
W
at
er
 T
ra
ns
.
Ai
r T
ra
ns
.
Tr
an
s 
se
rv
.
Te
le
co
m
Fi
n 
In
te
rm
ed
R
ea
l E
st
.
R
en
tin
g 
& 
O
th
er
 B
us
Ad
m
in
Ed
uc
H
ea
lth
So
cia
l
Pr
iv
at
e0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
(c) World in 1995 – Domestic
Ag
ric
ul
t
M
in
in
g
Fo
od
Te
xt
ile
 a
nd
 L
ea
th
er
W
oo
d
Pa
pe
r
Pe
tro
l
Ch
em
ica
ls
Pl
as
tic
s
M
in
er
al
s
M
et
al
s
Eq
ui
pm
en
ts
El
ec
t.
Co
ns
tr.
M
ot
or
W
ho
le
sa
le
R
et
ai
l
H
ot
el
In
la
nd
 T
ra
ns
.
W
at
er
 T
ra
ns
.
Ai
r T
ra
ns
.
Tr
an
s 
se
rv
.
Te
le
co
m
Fi
n 
In
te
rm
ed
R
ea
l E
st
.
R
en
tin
g 
& 
O
th
er
 B
us
Ad
m
in
Ed
uc
H
ea
lth
So
cia
l
Pr
iv
at
e
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
(d) Change from 1995 to 2014
Figure 1: Influence vectors for the world economy.
Figure 1 documents a bi-modal distribution for the worldwide influence vector in
1995: A first mode contains services, namely Renting and other business services, fi-
nancial intermediation, real estate (FIRE), and wholesale, and a second one contains
heavy manufacturing, namely equipments and metals. Interestingly, the 20 years since
1995 have witnessed an increase in already influent sectors: the largest increase oc-
curred in the most influent sector, Renting and other business services. The second
largest occurred in equipment goods, followed by mining. This is consistent with the
world becoming more granular over the period, in the sense that the aggregate influ-
ence of a few sectors has risen. Abstracting from trade in the lower panel shows that
a large part of the influence of manufactures originates from international trade: equip-
ment goods, in particular are much less influent abstracting from trade. Renting and
13
business services is still increasing the fastest between 1995 and 2014, even without the
effect of trade.
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(a) China 1995
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(b) Change from 1995 to 2014
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(c) China 1995 – Domestic
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(d) Change from 1995 to 2014
Figure 2: Influence vectors for China.
Figure 2 focuses on China, whose distribution is very different from the world’s.
In 1995, China’s most influent sectors are equipment goods, agriculture, metals, and
wholesale. Influence in China comes from heavy manufacturing sectors, and agriculture
– very little from services. Since 1995, equipment goods, electricity, mining and food
have become more influent, whereas metals, minerals, small manufacturing (like paper
or plastics), and agriculture have all become less influent. This is consistent with the
result that China’s tail estimates have increased since 1995, since newly large sectors
have emerged. The distribution of influence abstracting from trade, presented in the
lower panel, is similar to the rest of Figure 2 trade does affect the influence of Chinese
sectors, but it does so in a relatively homogeneous fashion across sectors.
14
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(a) USA 1995
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(b) Change from 1995 to 2014
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(d) Change from 1995 to 2014
Figure 3: Influence vectors for USA.
Figures 3 and 4 presents distribution estimates for the US and Germany. Both coun-
tries are predominantly service economies, with Renting and other business services the
most influent sector, along with FIRE and administrative services. Equipment goods
are the second most influent sector in Germany, and the fifth one in the US. In both
countries, Renting and other business services has seen the fastest rate of increase in the
20 years since 1995, but Germany also experienced a sustained increase in the influence
of several manufacturing sectors (equipments, electricity, petrol, and chemicals). This
explains the fall in the US tail estimate, and the somewhat muted fall in the German
estimate. The increase in the influence of Renting and other business services is largely
due to international trade in both countries, with muted changes in that sector once in-
ternational trade is abstracted from subfigures (c), (d), (g) and (h). This confirms the
specialization of both economies can be ascribed to trade.
3.2 Fundamental Volatility
This Section presents evidence on the consequences of microeconomic disturbances on
aggregate volatility. The key contribution is to extend existing results to the interna-
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(a) Germany 1995
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(b) Change from 1995 to 2014
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(d) Change from 1995 to 2014
Figure 4: Influence vectors for Germany
tional dimension, which makes it possible to isolate the role of international trade. We
investigate whether the rate of decay in aggregate volatility is sufficiently low that we
actually observe a systematic relationship between the observed volatility in GDP and
its fundamental counterpart, implied by the sector specialization of the economy, given
by
n∑
i=1
(
αiνi,t
)2
σ2i
where σ2i denotes the volatility of sector shocks.
14 We estimate the following panel
model
Vc,t = αc + γt + α
n∑
i=1
(
αiνi,t
)2
+ βZc.t + ξc,t, (3)
where Vc,t is the volatility of GDP in country c and at time t, and
∑n
i=1
(
αiνi,t
)2 is a
Herfindahl index of sector influence that is theoretically relevant for aggregate volatil-
ity in country c. The sector-level variance σ2i is omitted from the regression, since the
14A key assumption here is that the sector-level disturbances εit have time-invariant variance that is
constant across countries. We test this assumption in the robustness section.
16
assumption that σ2i,c,t = σ
2
i (for all c and t) implies that the variance of sector-level id-
iosyncratic shocks does not vary in the country-time dimension of the panel.15 αc is a
country-specific intercept, γt is a year effect, and Zc.t includes additional controls for
the patterns of aggregate volatility. Positive and significant estimates of α would con-
firm across countries the evidence focused on the US that can be found in Carvalho and
Gabaix (2013) or Acemoglu et al. (2012). Given the presence of country-specific inter-
cepts, estimates of α are to be interpreted as changes in the fundamental specialization
of the economy that over time tend to translate into changes in the volatility of GDP.
The decomposition of input-output linkages into purely domestic elements and those
arising from international trade has an immediate application to the definition of funda-
mental volatility, which can decompose into
n∑
i=1
αi
2 νDOMi,t
2
σi
2 +
n∑
i=1
αi
2 νTRADEi,t σi
2
where νTRADEi,t = ν
INT
i,t
2
+ 2νDOMi,t ν
INT
i,t . It follows that equation (3) can be readily
amended to evaluate the importance of international trade for the fundamental determi-
nant of aggregate volatility:
Vc,t = αc + γt + α1
n∑
i=1
(
αiν
DOM
i,t
)2
+ α2
n∑
i=1
αi
2 νTRADEi,t + βZc.t + ξc,t, (4)
The estimates of α1 and α2 decompose the sources of fundamental volatility between
those arising from purely domestic input-output linkages, and those arising from inter-
national trade, respectively.
The influence vector ν ′t
−j can be used to assess the global importance of a given
sector for aggregate volatility. We estimate
Vc,t = αc + γt + α
n∑
i=1,i 6=j
(
αiνi,t
)2
+ βZc.t + ξ
−j
c,t , (5)
where the influence vector is now computed abstracting from input-output linkages that
involve sector j. Equation (5) can help pinpoint the emergence of a large sector as a
cause for a rise in aggregate volatility across countries.
Analogously, the influence vectors ν ′t
−r can readily be used to evaluate the contri-
15This is confirmed in the robustness section.
17
bution of a given country to aggregate volatility. In particular, we estimate
V −rc,t = α
−r
c + γt + α
n∑
i=1
(
αiν
−r
i,t
)2
+ βZ−rc,t + ξ
−r
c,t , (6)
where the subscript −r denotes the exclusion of country r from the panel. The decom-
position can be implemented to address the role of an emerging China in world trade,
or the increasing fragmentation of the value chain across the US, Asia, and Europe.
In what follows, we present the results associated with the estimations of equations
(3) to (6) on the sample formed by the 40 countries with WIOT coverage. Measures
of Vc,t are obtained from the annual growth rates of real GDP in 2005 PPP dollars, as
reported by the Penn World Tables (version 9.0). The panel runs from 1986 to 2014, and
Vc,t is the volatility of GDP growth measured over 10-year rolling windows centered on
year t.16 Table 2 presents estimates of equations (3) and (4), including controls Zc.t in
specifications (3) and (4). We let volatility depend on financial and banking crises, as
mesured by Laeven and Valencia (2013), and on per capita GDP, following Koren and
Tenreyro (2007).
Table 2: Volatility of GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4)∑n
i (αiνi,t)
2 13.3 5.84
(3.36) (2.85)∑n
i (αiν
DOM
i,t )
2 2.68 -2.96
(5.55) (4.83)∑n
i α
2
i ν
TRADE
i,t 18.14 9.99
(4.33) (3.08)
Crisis 0.02 0.02
(0.03) (0.03)
Real GDP p.c. -0.73 -0.72
(0.18) (0.18)
R2 0.16 0.30 0.17 0.31
N × T 800 800 800 800
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients
and standard errors have been multiplied by 100 to fa-
cilitate readability. The computed standard errors are
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust, with a
Bartlett Kernel to account for the 10 years rolling win-
dows used to estimate the volatility of GDP. All regres-
sions include time-dummies and country fixed-effects.
16The standard errors are corrected for the serial correlation induced by the computation of volatility
in overlapping rolling windows using the standard Bartlett correction.
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Table 2 suggests that granular volatility prevails in the sample formed by 40 coun-
tries. Interestingly, the granularity that is related with international trade,
∑n
i=1 αi
2 νTRADEi,t ,
is always correlated significantly with aggregate volatility. The same is not true of the
granularity implied by the purely domestic component of WIOD. This is indicative of
the fact that international trade tends to exacerbate the granularity of the countries in
our sample, presumably through the specialization of the economy.
Table 3: Volatility of GDP cycles in regions
Region OECD-19 EU-15 EU-27 DVC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)∑n
i (αiνi,t)
2 7.33 7.19 -0.13 0.84
(2.53) (2.69) (0.09) (3.01)∑n
i (αiν
DOM
i,t )
2 6.30 6.97 -1.94 -1.70
(3.03) (3.39) (3.40) (2.77)∑n
i α
2
i ν
TRADE
i,t 8.30 7.65 -0.11 42.6
(2.24) (3.50) (0.09) (19.3)
Crisis 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.12 -0.004 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Real GDP p.c. -0.12 -0.15 -0.16 -0.17 -1.11 -1.11 -0.29 -0.17
(0.02) (0.02) (0.12) (0.11) (0.29) (0.29) (0.17) (0.14)
R2 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.31 0.40 0.40 0.27 0.30
N × T 380 380 300 300 540 540 180 180
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients and standard errors have been multi-
plied by 100 to facilitate readability. The computed standard errors are autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity robust, with a Bartlett Kernel to account for the 10 years rolling window
used to estimate the volatility of GDP. All regressions include time-dummies and country
fixed-effects. DVC countries include: Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, South
Korea, Turkey, and Taiwan.
Table 3 investigates composition effects by splitting the analysis in samples of OECD
countries, and relatively less developed economies including some emerging markets.17
Specifications (1) to (4) in the Table suggest the mechanism prevails exclusively in rich
developed countries, i.e., in a narrow sample of OECD economies or in the core of
the European Union. In those samples, we find that the fundamental determinants of
volatility are channeled by both the international and domestic components of interme-
diate trade. In the rest of the world, however, the effect is absent: the coefficients of
17OECD-19 includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland,
France, the UK, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the
USA. EU-15 includes Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, the UK, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden. EU-27 adds Bulgaria, Cyprus, the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
DVC includes Brazil, China, Indonesia, India, South Korea, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, and Taiwan.
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interest are insignificant in a sample formed by 27 EU members, including most of the
recent accession countries, and in a sample of developing countries.18 Fundamental de-
terminants of aggregate volatility seem to prevail in rich countries: according to Imbs
and Wacziarg (2003), those are the ones specializing, whereas less rich countries tend
to diversify.
Table 4: Volatility of GDP – pre-2001 and post-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)∑n
i (αiνi,t)
2 × pre-2001 -16.60 -15.62
(3.46) (3.10)∑n
i (αiνi,t)
2 15.31 10.07
(3.17) (2.74)∑n
i (αiνi,t)
2 × post-2007 1.14 -1.50
(1.58) (1.86)∑n
i (αiν
DOM
i,t )
2 × pre-2001 -20.65 -18.80
(4.40) (3.85)∑n
i αiν
TRADE
i,t × pre-2001 -12.62 -12.63
(2.62) (2.44)∑n
i (αiν
DOM
i,t )
2 3.73 0.22
(4.48) (3.80)∑n
i α
2
i ν
TRADE
i,t 22.43 16.65
(3.97) (3.28)∑n
i (αiν
DOM
i,t )
2 × post-2007 1.31 -1.40
(1.99) (2.30)∑n
i α
2
i ν
TRADE
i,t × post-2007 -0.51 -2.63
(1.44) (1.70)
Crises 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.03)
Real GDP p.c. -0.64 -0.60
(0.17) (0.15)
R2 0.29 0.40 0.34 0.42
N × T 800 800 800 800
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The dummy variable
pre-2001 takes value 1 for t < 2001 and 0 otherwise; post-2007 takes
value 1 for t > 2007 and 0 otherwise. Coefficients and standard er-
rors have been multiplied by 100 to facilitate readability. The computed
standard errors are autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust, with a
Bartlett Kernel to account for the 10 years rolling window used to esti-
mate the volatility of GDP. All regressions include time-dummies and
country fixed-effects.
18The large point estimates for developing countries come from the time pattern of volatility experi-
enced by Russia over the sample, which correlates highly with
∑n
i αiν
TRADE
i because of commodity
prices. Without Russia, the coefficient on
∑n
i αiν
TRADE
i becomes insignificant.
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Table 4 checks how the results hold through the sample period. We split the sample
into three periods: (i) from 1995 to 2000, the early years of the Great Moderation, (ii)
from 2001 to 2007, the globalization years, with China becoming a member of the World
Trade Organization, and (iii) from 2008 to 2014, the Great Recession years. Specifica-
tion (1) examines how the estimates of α change over time, introducing two indicator
variables: the first taking values one before 2001, and the second taking values one af-
ter 2007. Unconditional estimates correspond to the globalization period. The results
are interesting: the period before 2001 displays significantly less fundamental volatility
than the rest of the sample, suggesting the mechanism at play started in earnest with the
globalization period, where the coefficient is in fact positive and significant. But there
was no acceleration of the phenomenon after 2007. Specification (3) examines the role
of trade in each of the sub-period: whereas the negative coefficient in the pre-2001 pe-
riod applies to both domestic and international fundamental volatilities, the acceleration
during the globalization period is exclusively driven by the traded component of fun-
damental volatility. These conclusions are unchanged by the inclusion of the controls
in specifications (2) and (4). The emergence of fundamental determinants to aggregate
volatility seems to be strongly associated with the globalization of the world economy
from 2001, but left unchanged by the global financial crisis from 2008 onwards.
Table 5 investigates whether these results are driven by specific sectors. The table
focuses on the three samples of countries where we found significant results. We com-
puted ν ′t
−j for all j measured at the one-digit level, and estimated equation (3) for each
implied value of
∑n
i=1,i 6=j
(
αiνi,t
)2. The table reports results for all the sectors whose
omission affects the significance of α in equation (5), considering all three samples.
We find Finance and Real Estate (FIRE) has by far the strongest influence on the re-
sults: When fundamental volatility is computed without FIRE, it becomes insignificant
for GDP volatility in all considered samples. There are other sectors that have some
effects on the estimates, but they are more limited. For example, wholesale trade, agri-
culture, and equipment all result in insignificant estimates of α in the world sample, but
not elsewhere. Finally, for illustrative purposes we include Telecommunications, which
does not affect any of the estimates: This is the case for all other sectors, not listed in
the Table for the sake of brevity. We conclude that in developed countries, fundamen-
tal volatility is driven by the FIRE sector. In the world at large, it is globally influent
sectors that matter for aggregate volatility: wholesale trade, agriculture, and equipment.
We note the list includes sectors whose influence has been increasing since the 1990’s,
and both traded and non-traded activities.
Finally, we experimented with estimating equation (6), performed in samples omit-
ting the largest economies in the world, one at a time. We experimented with omitting
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Table 5: Volatility of GDP without Industries
Without FIRE Wholesale Agric. Equip. Telecom.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: World∑n
i (αiνi,t)
2 0.02 4.52 -0.01 -0.22 5.65
(0.03) (2.89) (0.003) (0.29) (2.77)
Crises 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Real GDP p.c. -0.76 -0.74 -0.76 -0.76 -0.73
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
R2 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.30
N × T 800 800 800 800 800
Panel B: OECD-19∑n
i (αiνi,t)
2 2.65 5.65 7.03 7.76 6.95
(1.68) (2.92) (2.47) (2.44) (2.30)
Crises 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Real GDP p.c. -0.13 -0.11 -0.11 -0.13 -0.13
(0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
R2 0.20 0.24 0.29 0.30 0.29
N × T 380 380 380 380 380
Panel C: EU-15∑n
i (αiνi,t)
2 0.77 5.29 6.57 7.99 6.94
(1.61) (3.12) (2.60) (2.73) (2.61)
Crises 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Real GDP p.c. -0.21 -0.17 -0.16 -0.17 -0.17
(0.15) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12)
R2 0.20 0.27 0.30 0.32 0.31
N × T 300 300 300 300 300
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients and standard
errors have been multiplied by 100 to facilitate readability. The com-
puted standard errors are autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust,
with a Bartlett Kernel to account for the 10 years rolling windows used
to estimate the volatility of GDP. All regressions include time-dummies
and country fixed-effects. The industries are (1) Finance Intermediation
and Real Estate Activities; (2) Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade,
Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; (3) Agriculture, Hunting,
Forestry and Fishing; (4) Machinery, Electrical, Optical, Transport Equip-
ment, Manufacturing, Recycling; and (5) Post and Telecommunications.
the US, Japan, Germany, or China. We found no instances of significance loss, and no
instances of significant changes in point estimates. This suggests that no single country
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can account for the significance of fundamental volatility, despite its relative prevalence
amongst developed economies.
3.3 Fundamental Co-Movements
Define the fundamental correlation coefficient between aggregate fluctuations in two
countries c and s:
Corr
 n∑
i=1
αciν
c
itεit,
n∑
i=1
αsiν
s
itεit

where we have assumed the sector-level shock εit affects all countries identically. The
coefficient constitutes a fundamental explanation for aggregate cycle synchronization:
fluctuations between countries c and s resemble each other whenever influent sectors
are similar. This is entirely determined by the fundamental structure of each economy,
i.e., input-output linkages.
We estimate the following panel regression
ρcs,t = αcs + γt + β fcorrcs,t+θXcs.t + ξcs,t, (7)
where ρcs,t measures the correlation of aggregate fluctuations between countries c and
s, and fcorrcs,t = Corr
(∑n
i=1 α
c
iν
c
it,
∑n
i=1 α
s
iν
s
it
)
. Of course, fcorrcs,t should involves
all of the cross-products between sector-level shocks, E εitεjt, for all i, j. We omit these
cross-products from the regression. This builds from the hypothesis that E ε2it = σ
2
i (for
all t), and requires as well that E εitεjt = σij (for all t and i 6= j) for all countries.
In the robustness section, we relax both assumptions, and investigate how our results
are affected with empirically motivated covariances E εitεjt. αcs denotes a country–
pair specific intercept, γt accounts for yearly systematic variation in international co-
movements, and Xcs.t denotes controls for cycle synchronization that vary across coun-
try pairs and over time. The prediction is that estimates of β are positive, i.e., that rising
fundamental correlation implies increasingly correlated cycles.
The decomposition of aggregate fluctuations in equation (2) extends readily to mea-
sures of co-movements. By definition, we have
fcorrcs,t = Corr
 n∑
i=1
αci ν
DOM
i,t
c
+
n∑
i=1
αci ν
INT
i,t
c
,
n∑
i=1
αsi ν
DOM
i,t
s
+
n∑
i=1
αsi ν
INT
i,t
s

= fcorrDOMcs,t + fcorr
TRADE
cs,t
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where
fcorrDOMcs,t = Corr
 n∑
i=1
αci ν
DOM
i,t
c
,
n∑
i=1
αsi ν
DOM
i,t
s
 ,
and fcorrTRADEcs,t = fcorrcs,t− fcorrDOMcs,t . Equation (7) can then be amended to explore
empirically how trade affects fundamental co-movements, as in
ρcs,t = αcs + γt + β1 fcorr
DOM
cs,t +β2 fcorr
TRADE
cs,t +θXcs.t + ξcs,t. (8)
The estimates of β1 and β2 identify separately the impact of domestic vs. international
input-output linkages on the emergence of granular co-movements.
It is straightforward to evaluate the impact of a given country or a given sector on
fundamental co-movements. We simply amend equation (7) to make use of the influence
vectors defined in Section 2.3, where individual countries or sectors are omitted. In
particular we estimate
ρ−rcs,t = α
−r
cs + γt + β fcorr
−r
cs,t+θX
−r
cs.t + ξ
−r
cs,t, (9)
where the subscript −r indicates that country r is omitted from the cross section. Simi-
larly, we estimate
ρcs,t = αcs + γt + β Corr
 n∑
i=1,i 6=j
αciν
c
it,
n∑
i=1,i 6=j
αsiν
s
it
+ θXcs.t + ξ−jcs,t, (10)
which abstracts from sector j. Equations (9) and (10) explore the empirical importance
of country r and sector j in driving co-movements, either globally or within a specific
region. Of course, it is possible to combine the decompositions to evaluate whether,
for instance, the emergence of a country or a sector that matters for co-movements is
related to international trade.
We next present the results associated with the estimations of equations (7) to (10)
on the sample formed by the 40 countries with WIOT coverage. The measures of ρcs,t
are computed from the annual growth rates of real GDP in 2005 PPP dollars, as reported
by the Penn World Tables (version 9.0). The panel runs from 1995 to 2014. The con-
ventional determinants of co-movements include the magnitude of bilateral goods trade,
normalized by total trade (see Frankel and Rose, 1998), and the magnitude of bilateral
financial linkages, measured by bank asset holdings across borders normalized by GDP
or total population (see Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2013b). Bilateral trade intensity is mea-
sured each year using the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics, and bilateral financial
linkages are measured using the International Locational Banking Statistics released by
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the Bank of International Settlements.
Columns (1), (2), and (3) of Table 6 present the estimates of β in equation (7).
The decomposition into traded and non traded components from equation (8) is pre-
sented in specifications (4), (5), and (6). Specifications (1) and (4) use the full sam-
ple; specifications (2), (3), (5), and (6) use the reduced sample where the controls are
available. The estimates of β are positive and significant across all specifications, irre-
spective of the sample, and whether the controls Xcs.t are included or not. The results
suggest that fundamental explanations for aggregate co-movements are relevant empiri-
cally. What is more, both the domestic and the international components of fundamental
co-movements appear to affect significantly aggregate co-fluctuations.
Table 6: Correlation of GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
fcorrcs,t 16.01 15.57 14.41
(2.29) (2.42) (2.42)
fcorrDOMcs,t 17.45 17.69 16.58
(2.58) (2.77) (2.74)
fcorrTRADEcs,t 11.43 9.21 7.90
(3.75) (4.11) (4.10)
Banking 0.05 0.04
(0.04) (0.04)
Trade 0.32 0.33
(0.11) (0.12)
R2 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.09
N × T 15600 11602 11602 15600 11602 11602
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients and standard er-
rors have been multiplied by 100 to facilitate readability. The computed
standard errors are clustered by country pair. All regressions include
time-dummies and country pair fixed-effects.
The question whether countries that share identical sectors display positive co-movements
is an old one. For instance, Imbs (2004) provides support to the claim, whereas Baxter
and Kouparitsas (2005) argue sector similarities are not robustly siginificant. The mea-
sure for sector similarities used in this paper has sounder theoretical grounds than earlier
papers, as it is implied by theory. It also encapsulates the potential propagation mech-
anisms created by trade linkages. In fact, columns (4), (5), and (6) in the table confirm
that the component of input-output linkages that is associated with international trade
does translate in positive co-movements.
Table 7 considers sub-samples first focused on rich developed countries, and in-
troducing progressively less developed economies: OECD-19 and EU-15 are narrow
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samples of developed economies, EU-27 and DVC include more developing countries.
The results suggest that aggregate co-movements do have fundamental origins in rich,
developed countries: in the reduced sample of 19 OECD countries, in the core EU-15,
and in the enlarged EU-27, but not in a sample focused on developing economies. Both
fcorrDOMcs,t and fcorr
INT
cs,t affect significantly GDP fluctuations, except in the core EU-15,
where it is only the domestic component that matters. The data paint a clear picture:
Intermediate trade within and between countries has resulted in international patterns of
specialization that tend to increase co-movements: this is true in developed countries,
but not in the developing world.
Table 7: Correlation of GDP in regions
Region OECD-19 EU-15 EU-27 DVC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
fcorrcs,t 14.51 10.32 3.42 -8.54
(4.06) (4.95) (0.83) (16.7)
fcorrDOMcs,t 12.44 10.26 8.54 -2.09
(4.15) (5.03) (2.11) (18.0)
fcorrTRADEcs,t 17.27 10.41 2.44 -40.83
(5.16) (6.70) (0.75) (24.7)
Banking 0.21 0.21 0.32 0.32 0.09 0.08 0.20 0.19
(0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.12) (0.06) (0.06) (0.13) (0.13)
Trade 0.79 0.65 1.34 1.34 0.59 0.55 1.26 1.03
(0.18) (0.19) (0.23) (0.23) (0.16) (0.16) (0.84) (0.90)
R2 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.24 0.24
N × T 3339 3339 2041 2041 5380 5380 402 402
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients and standard errors have been
multiplied by 100 to facilitate readability. The computed standard errors are clustered by
country pair. All regressions include time-dummies and country pair fixed-effects. DVC
countries include: Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, South Korea, Turkey,
and Taiwan.
Table 8 checks how the results hold through time. We perform the same split as in
the previous section, into three periods: (i) from 1995 to 2000, (ii) from 2001 to 2007,
and (iii) from 2008 to 2014. Specification (1) performs this split in the sample without
controls, while specifications (2) and (3) use the sample with controls. In all three cases,
fundamental determinants of aggregate synchronization emerge in 2001, and accelerate
with the great recession of 2008. Specifications (4), (5), and (6) examine whether this
progression can be ascribed to international trade. The results are ambiguous: while is
it trade in the earlier period, prior to 2001, it is not in the middle period, and it is both
domestic and international forces from 2008. It seems therefore that the acceleration in
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fundamental correlation during the great recession came from both domestic and traded
intermediates.
Table 8: Correlation of GDP – pre-2001 and post-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
fcorrcs,t× pre-2001 1.26 0.77 0.63
(1.21) (1.37) (1.39)
fcorrcs,t 13.51 13.40 12.2
(2.22) (2.36) (2.37)
fcorrcs,t× post-2007 4.33 3.99 4.02
(0.80) (0.86) (0.84)
fcorrDOMcs,t × pre-2001 1.35 0.71 0.59
(1.14) (1.23) (1.25)
fcorrTRADEcs,t × post-2007 16.75 25.89 25.21
(3.35) (3.69) (3.73)
fcorrDOMcs,t 13.36 13.84 12.91
(2.50) (2.52) (2.51)
fcorrTRADEcs,t 4.87 2.00 1.05
(3.75) (4.31) (4.30)
fcorrDOMcs,t × post-2007 4.27 3.91 3.93
(0.79) (0.83) (0.82)
fcorrTRADEcs,t × post-2007 9.47 8.60 8.44
(1.99) (2.20) (2.18)
Banking 0.04 0.03
(0.04) (0.04)
Trade 0.35 0.29
(0.12) (0.11)
R2 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11
N × T 15600 15600 11602 15600 11602 11602
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The dummy variable pre-2001 takes value 1 for
t < 2001 and 0 otherwise; post-2007 takes value 1 for t > 2007 and 0 otherwise. Coef-
ficients and standard errors have been multiplied by 100 to facilitate readability. The com-
puted standard errors are clustered by country pair. All regressions include time-dummies
and country pair fixed-effects.
Can these results be ascribed to one or few sectors? Table 9 presents the results of
estimating equation (10), where each sector is omitted from the computation of fcorrcs,t,
one at a time. The table reports only the sectors whose omission overturns significance
in the samples where GDP correlations are found to have significant fundamental ex-
planations, namely the full world, OECD-19, EU-15, and EU-27. We find that no single
sector can explain the significance of fcorrcs,t in all four samples: In particular, no sin-
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Table 9: Correlation of GDP without Industries
Without Constr. FIRE Bus. Serv. Constr. FIRE Bus. Serv.
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Panel A: World Panel B: OECD-19
fcorrcs,t 17.9 9.54 11.9 6.76 6.16 1.68
(1.61) (0.60) (1.64) (3.72) (1.37) (3.27)
Banking 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.25 0.27 0.27
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Trade 0.24 0.30 0.34 0.67 0.69 0.65
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
R2 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09
N × T 11602 11602 11602 3339 3339 3339
Panel C: EU-15 Panel D: EU-27
fcorrcs,t -2.01 3.61 -3.42 0.85 10.4 11.7
(4.54) (5.63) (4.05) (1.08) (2.50) (2.66)
Banking 0.40 0.38 0.40 0.25 0.09 0.09
(0.13) (0.04) (0.12) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Trade 1.24 1.30 1.23 0.59 0.50 0.54
(0.24) (0.22) (0.24) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15)
R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.07
N × T 2041 2041 2041 5380 5380 5380
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients and standard errors have
been multiplied by 100 to facilitate readability. The computed standard errors
are clustered by country pair. All regressions include time-dummies and country
pair fixed-effects. The industries are (1) Construction; (2) Finance Intermediation
and Real Estate Activities; and (3) Renting of Machinery & Equipment and Other
Business Activities.
gle sector can explain the significance in the full world sample, where co-movements
have robust fundamental determinants irrespective of what single sector is omitted. We
identify three sectors where significance is weakened in two out of four samples. Omit-
ting construction overturns the significance of fundamental correlation in the two EU
samples, but not in the OECD where it is still significant at 10 percent confidence level.
Omitting FIRE or business services overturns significance in the OECD and EU-15
samples, but not in the EU-27. We conclude construction, FIRE, and business services
play a role in explaining fundamental sources of co-movements in developed countries,
but not globally, where fundamental co-movements cannot be ascribed to a sector in
particular.
Finally, following equation (9) we examined whether the omission of any single
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(large) economy from the sample alters the results. Just as in the previous section on
volatility, there is no single large economy that seems to drive the results, in that omitting
the US, China, Japan, or Germany does not affect the significance of any result, nor does
it change point estimates significantly.
4 Robustness
4.1 Homogeneous factor and expenditure shares
The paper has so far allowed for sector-specific labor shares αi, and for empirical final
expenditure shares βi. Given the importance of both parameters in the computation
of the influence vectors, and therefore in the definitions of fundamental volatility and
co-movements, it is of interest to explore the robustness of our results to homogeneous
values for both parameters.
The upper panel of Table 10 presents estimates of fundamental volatility under ho-
mogeneous αi and βi with similar conclusions as in the main text: fundamental volatil-
ity is significant, and mostly driven by international trade. The lower panel of Table
10 presents results for fundamental correlation. Our conclusions are unchanged: fun-
damental correlation prevails in the data, and finds its sources in both its domestic and
traded components.
4.2 Including Sector Shocks
The decomposition of aggregate fluctuations into sector-level components lends great
importance to sector-level disturbances, which finds support in a number of papers, e.g.,
Long and Plosser (1987) or Atalay (2017) for instance. Kose et al. (2008) find that inter-
national shocks contribute the majority of country-specific fluctuations. Foerster et al.
(2011) and Atalay (2017) show that accounting for endogenous propagation between
sectors magnifies the estimated role of sector-specific disturbances.19 Up to now, we
have imposed specific conditions on these shocks: in particular, we have imposed that
E εit 2 = σ2i and E εitεjt = σij (for all t and i 6= j), where both σ2i and σij are constant
across countries.
We now estimate εit following Gabaix (2011). We compute the growth rate in
output per worker zi,c,t for sectors i = 1, . . . , 31, countries c = 1, . . . , 40, and time
t = 1995, . . . , 2014. We combine output from WIOT with employment data from the
19Here we do not estimate separately “true” sector shocks and their propagation through the economy.
Our sector shocks encapsulate both components. Our results that international trade matters for volatility
and co-movements suggest input-output linkages propagate shocks across countries, with consequences
on aggregate moments. In that, our approach is complementary to Stumpner (2015) or Acemoglu et al.
(2016).
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Table 10: Homogenous α and β
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Volatility of GDP∑n
i ν
2
i,t 9.27 6.32
(2.76) (2.88)∑n
i ν
2 DOM
i,t 6.21 -2.47
(5.39) (4.31)∑n
i ν
TRADE
i,t 11.89 13.58
(2.39) (2.55)
Crisis 0.02 0.02
(0.03) (0.03)
Real GDP p.c. -0.74 -0.77
(0.18) (0.18)
R2 0.15 0.30 0.15 0.31
N × T 800 800 800 800
Panel A: Correlation of GDP
fcorrcs,t 14.3 12.0
(2.31) (2.68)
fcorrDOMcs,t 14.5 12.0
(2.30) (2.69)
fcorrTRADEcs,t 21.4 13.3
(4.15) (4.58)
Banking 0.06 0.06
(0.04) (0.05)
Trade 0.30 0.30
(0.11) (0.11)
R2 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.09
N × T 15600 11602 15600 11602
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients
and standard errors have been multiplied by 100 to fa-
cilitate readability. αi = α for all i and βi = 1n , where
n is the number of sectors. The computed standard er-
rors in Panel A are autocorrelation and heteroskedas-
ticity robust, with a Bartlett Kernel to account for the
10 years rolling window used to estimate the volatil-
ity of GDP. The computed standard errors in Panel
B are clustered by country pair. All regressions in-
clude time-dummies and either country fixed-effects
or country pair fixed-effects.
socio-economic accounts, also published as part of WIOD. We estimate
zi,c,t = γ + γi + γc + γt + εi,c,t.
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Sector-specific shocks are defined as demeaned labor productivity growth, allowing for
sector, country and time specific effects. The shocks are allowed to vary by sector and by
country: We want to establish whether these shocks’ variances and covariances display
a meaningful dispersion across countries.
Armed with estimates of εi,c,t we perform a battery of tests to verify our assump-
tions. We first verify the time invariance of variance estimates σ2i,c for 31 sectors in 40
countries. We compute sector-level variances over two periods, 1996 – 2007 and 2008
– 2014, reasoning the most likely structural break in the data probably happened around
the Great Recession. We then perform Levene (1960) tests of variance differences for
all 1,240 (= 31 × 40) variance estimates. We find not a single instance of a significant
variance change.20
Next we test whether sector-level variances are different across countries. For each
country c, the null hypothesis is that σ2i,c = σ
2
i,US where σ
2
i,US denotes the variance of
shocks in sector i measured in the US. The Levene test is performed for each country-
sector in comparison with the US, reasoning that sector-level technological develop-
ments are best mirrored in US data. We find a total of 197 rejections, out of a total of
1,209 (= 31 × 39), which represents 16.3 percent of instances where sector variances
are significantly different from the US.21 The proportion goes down to 2.5 percent with
the False Discovery Rate correction, and to 2.1 percent with the Bonferroni correction.
The assumption that sector shocks resembles each other across countries is therefore
largely supported by the data.22
Finally, we want to investigate the properties of E εitεjt. Our goal is to ascertain
the empirical properties of the variance covariance matrices E εitεjt across sectors for
all countries. We first investigate whether the hypothesis that all covariances are time
invariant is supported in the data. To do so, we implement the test introduced by Sri-
vastava et al. (2014) that lends itself best to the large number of sectors relative to the
small sample size. The test statistic is based on the distance between the two com-
pared variance-covariance matrices, as captured by their traces. We split the sample in
2008, and perform the test (corrected for multiple comparisons) on the two resulting
sub-periods. We find that there are only three variance-covariance matrices for which
the null of time invariance is rejected: Brazil, Luxembourg, and Slovakia. We conclude
20This continues to be true if we split the data in 2006 or in 2008, and if we perform the corrections
necessary when performing multiple comparisons, like the Bonferroni or the False Discovery Rate cor-
rections.
21Half of these instances prevail in seven small European countries: Estonia, Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia,
Malta, Slovakia, and Romania.
22On the other hand, sector shocks are clearly heterogeneous within countries: we also test whether
σ2i,c = σ
2
US where σ
2
US denotes the average sector variance in the US. That hypothesis is rejected in all
cases.
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the hypothesis that E εitεjt is time invariant is supported in the data.23 We perform our
estimation imposing this constraint on the empirical covariances by computing the av-
erages of the shock estimates εi,c,t over the full sample 1995 – 2014. As an alternative
check, we also compute the averages shock estimates over two sub-periods 1995 – 2007
and 2008 – 2014. That way we actually allow for covariances σij,c,t that vary by pairs
of sectors, by country, and over two periods.
Table 11: Volatility of GDP with sectoral variances
(1) (2) (3)∑n
i (αiνi,t σi)
2 × pre-2001 -6.00
(1.36)∑n
i (αiνi,t σi)
2 4.38 6.23
(1.47) (1.49)∑n
i (αiνi,t σi)
2 × post-2007 -0.60
(0.89)∑n
i (αiν
DOM
i,t σi)
2 1.08
(2.25)∑n
i α
2
i ν
TRADE
i,t σ
2
i 6.18
(1.68)
Crises 0.01 0.002 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Real GDP p.c. -0.72 -0.64 -0.70
(0.17) (0.17) (0.18)
R2 0.31 0.37 0.31
N × T 800 800 800
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The dummy vari-
able pre-2001 takes value 1 for t < 2001 and 0 otherwise;
post-2007 takes value 1 for t > 2007 and 0 otherwise. σ2i
are the U.S. sectoral variances. Coefficients and standard
errors have been multiplied by 100 to facilitate readability.
The computed standard errors are autocorrelation and het-
eroskedasticity robust, with a Bartlett Kernel to account for
the 10 years rolling window used to estimate the volatility
of GDP. All regressions include time-dummies and country
fixed-effects.
Table 11 presents the volatility results when fundamental volatility is computed as∑n
i=1
(
αiνi,t
)2
σ2i , using U.S. estimates for σ
2
i . The Table presents the total effect of fun-
damental volatility, its decomposition between traded and domestic components, and its
evolution over time. The results are very similar to the estimates obtained abstract-
23On the other hand, the covariances are clearly different across countries: the Srivastava test rejects
the null of equality with the US estimate in 80 percent of the cases, down to 60 percent with correction
for multiple comparaisons.
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ing from σ2i :
∑n
i=1
(
αiνi,t
)2
σ2i is a significant determinant of GDP volatility, mostly
because of trade, and mostly since the globalization period since 2001. There is no
observable change with the great recession of 2008. The only difference are slightly
smaller point estimates, which happens because the regressors now include a volatility
measure.
Table 12 presents the correlation results when sector shocks are allowed back into
the measure of fundamental co-movements. Panel A presents results with a measure
of fundamental co-movements given by Corr
(∑n
i=1 α
c
iν
c
itεi,c,
∑n
i=1 α
s
iν
s
itεi,c
)
. Panel B
uses instead Corr
(∑n
i=1 α
c
iν
c
itεi,c,T ,
∑n
i=1 α
s
iν
s
itεi,s,T
)
where T = 1995− 2007, 2008−
2014. The Table presents the total effect of fundamental correlation, its decomposition
into traded and domestic components, and its evolution over time. Our results carry
through across the two panels: fcorrcs,t is significant, its effect prevails from 2001, and
accelerates from 2008, and both domestic and traded components matter. The only
slight difference relative to Table 6 is the insignificant effect of international trade in
Panel B. It was significant at 10 percent confidence level in Table 6.
Table 12: Correlation of GDP with sectoral shocks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: time invariant Panel B: pre/post 2008
fcorrcs,t,εi,c ×pre-2001 0.60 0.91
(1.18) (1.16)
fcorrcs,t,εi,c 14.8 12.2 6.01 3.27
(2.46) (2.42) (0.84) (0.95)
fcorrcs,t,εi,c ×post-2007 3.62 4.06
(0.69) (0.66)
fcorrDOMcs,t,εi,c 15.6 6.27
(2.65) (0.82)
fcorrTRADEcs,t,εi,c 12.4 -0.80
(4.42) (2.12)
Banking 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Trade 0.31 0.33 0.31 0.31 0.34 0.32
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
R2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.10
N × T 11602 11602 11602 11602 11602 11602
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The dummy variable pre-2001 takes value
1 for t < 2001 and 0 otherwise; post-2007 takes value 1 for t > 2007 and 0 otherwise.
Coefficients and standard errors have been multiplied by 100 to facilitate readability.
The computed standard errors are clustered by country pair. All regressions include
time-dummies and country pair fixed-effects.
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4.3 An Alternative Measure of Co-Movements
Giannone et al. (2011), Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013a), and Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013b)
use an alternative measure of co-movements Scs,t, based on the absolute difference in
GDP growth rates between countries c and s:
Scs,t = −
∣∣yc,t − ys,t∣∣ ,
where yc,t denotes the growth rate of GDP in country c at time t. The measure presents
two key advantages: first it is readily observable at yearly frequency. Second, it is
invariant to the volatility of the underlying shock, see Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and
Corsetti et al. (2005). With this definition, fundamental co-movements are given by
abscorrcs,t = −
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
(
αciνci,t − αsiνsi,t
)
εit
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = −
√√√√√
 n∑
i=1
δcs,i,t εit
2
where shocks are assumed to be common across borders, and δcs,i,t = αciνci,t − αsiνsi,t
denotes the international difference in the contribution of sector i to GDP fluctuations.
Since E ε2it = σ
2
i , and E εitεjt is constant across countries, the only source of variation
in cycle synchronization across country pairs are the values taken by
∑n
i=1
(
δcs,i,t
)2.
Table 13: Correlation of GDP – Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
abscorrcs,t 27.02 24.17 22.21
(4.31) (4.44) (4.42)
abscorrDOMcs,t 30.60 30.19 28.36
(6.34) (6.67) (6.60)
abscorrTRADEcs,t 22.50 17.33 15.24
(6.00) (6.36) (6.34)
Banking 0.05 0.05
(0.04) (0.04)
Trade 0.36 0.37
(0.12) (0.12)
R2 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09
N × T 15600 11602 11602 15600 11602 11602
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients and standard er-
rors have been multiplied by 100 to facilitate readability. The computed
standard errors are clustered by country pair. All regressions include time-
dummies and country pair fixed-effects.
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Table 14: Correlation of GDP – Robustness pre-2001 and post-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
abscorrcs,t×pre-2001 2.60 2.77 2.46
(2.47) (2.79) (2.81)
abscorrcs,t 22.12 19.12 17.00
(4.22) (4.37) (4.39)
abscorrcs,t×post-2007 7.40 7.07 7.21
(1.65) (1.76) (1.71)
abscorrDOMcs,t ×pre-2001 -6.29 -8.63 -8.48
(2.56) (2.83) (2.89)
abscorrTRADEcs,t ×pre-2001 25.74 30.03 28.77
(4.34) (4.68) (4.67)
abscorrDOMcs,t 22.55 26.44 25.09
(6.23) (6.65) (6.64)
abscorrTRADEcs,t 16.07 11.40 9.83
(5.87) (6.44) (6.44)
abscorrDOMcs,t ×post-2007 7.57 7.11 7.31
(1.82) (1.95) (1.93)
abscorrTRADEcs,t ×post-2007 7.15 6.97 6.89
(2.63) (2.72) (2.68)
Banking 0.05 0.02
(0.04) (0.04)
Trade 0.38 0.29
(0.12) (0.11)
R2 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.10
N × T 15600 11602 11602 15600 11602 11602
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The dummy variable pre-2001 takes value 1
for t < 2001 and 0 otherwise; post-2007 takes value 1 for t > 2007 and 0 otherwise.
Coefficients and standard errors have been multiplied by 100 to facilitate readability. The
computed standard errors are clustered by country pair. All regressions include time-
dummies and country pair fixed-effects.
Define δDOMcs,i,t = αciν
DOM
ci,t −αsiνDOMsi,t to reflect the similarities in fundamental fluctu-
ations between countries c and s that arise from purely domestic input-output linkages,
and δINTcs,i,t = αciν
INT
ci,t − αsiνINTsi,t to capture those that arise via international trade. We
have δcs,i,t = δDOMcs,i,t + δ
INT
cs,i,t. Then
n∑
i=1
(
δcs,i,t
)2
=
n∑
i=1
(
δDOMcs,i,t + δ
INT
cs,i,t
)2
≡
n∑
i=1
(
δDOMcs,i,t
)2
+
n∑
i=1
δTRADEcs,i,t .
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An approximate decomposition of abscorrcs,t is given by
abscorrcs,t = −
√√√√ n∑
i=1
(
δDOMcs,i,t
)2
+
n∑
i=1
δTRADEcs,i,t
≈ −
√√√√ n∑
i=1
(
δDOMcs,i,t
)2
−
√√√√ n∑
i=1
δTRADEcs,i,t
for negligible values of
(∑n
i=1
(
δDOMcs,i,t
)2) 12 (∑n
i=1 δ
TRADE
cs,i,t
) 1
2
.
Table 13 present the estimates of β in equations (7) and (8) where the values for
fcorrcs,t are replaced with abscorrcs,t. The first three specifications confirm that aggre-
gate comovements continue to have significant fundamental origins with the alternative
measure of correlations. The last three specifications confirm that both domestic and
international elements in abscorrcs,t account for aggregate co-fluctuations.
Table 14 verifies how the significance of abscorrcs,t evolves over the three sub-
periods we consider. We confirm that fundamental co-movements appear with the glob-
alization period starting in 2001, and accelerate further after 2007. The decomposition
into traded and domestic components confirms both effects continue to be present in the
data.
5 Conclusion
We investigate the empirical relevance of granularity in driving aggregate GDP moments
in a broad cross-section of countries. The argument builds on a classic model of input-
output trade where fluctuations in aggregate GDP are given by a weighted average of
sector shocks, with weights reflecting the influence of a sector in the aggregate. We test
the model predictions using recently released World Input-Output Tables, with a view
to decomposing the changes in granularity in the world economy into a component that
originates in purely domestic trade, and another that captures the role of international
trade.
We find that granularity increased significantly in developed countries over the past
20 years, in the sense that influent sectors increased further in influence. Worldwide, the
trend goes the other way, thanks to the emergence in China of newly influent sectors,
which results in a diversifying Chinese economy. In developed countries we find that
GDP volatility depends significantly on fundamental volatility, i.e., on the granularity
of the economy. This is especially true since the start of the globalization period in
2001, and it is mostly due to international trade in intermediate goods. In developed
countries, GDP co-movements also depend significantly on their fundamental determi-
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nants, i.e., on similarities in granularity across countries. This has been prevalent since
2001, has accelerated since 2008, and is due to both domestic and international trade in
intermediate goods.
Finally, we find that a few sectors can explain some of these results. The FIRE
sector is central in accounting for fundamental sources of GDP volatility in developed
countries. In contrast, no single sector can explain away the fundamental origins of GDP
co-movements. In developed countries, the Construction, FIRE, and Business Services
weaken some, but not all, of the significant estimates. Interestingly, this paper’s results
cannot be ascribed to a single country: Our conclusions are similar in samples where
the US economy, China, Japan, Germany, or the UK are omitted from the exercise. In
other words, the importance of granularity in developed countries depends much more
on specific sectors than it does on specific countries.
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Appendix
Table A1: Pervasiveness of sectors
1995 – 2014 1995 – 2007 2008 – 2014
World Renting & Other Bus. Renting & Other Bus. Renting & Other Bus.
Fin Intermed. Fin Intermed. Fin Intermed.
Equipments Equipments Equipments
World w/o USA Renting & Other Bus. Renting & Other Bus. Renting & Other Bus.
Fin Intermed. Fin Intermed. Fin Intermed.
Equipments Equipments Equipments
World w/o China Renting & Other Bus. Renting & Other Bus. Renting & Other Bus.
Fin Intermed. Fin Intermed. Fin Intermed.
Equipments Equipments Equipments
Germany Renting & Other Bus. Renting & Other Bus Renting & Other Bus.
Trans serv. Equipments Trans serv.
Equipments Trans serv. Equipments
USA Renting & Other Bus. Renting & Other Bus. Renting & Other Bus.
Fin Intermed. Fin Intermed. Fin Intermed.
Equipments Equipments Real Est.
China Equipments Equipments Equipments
Chemicals Chemicals Chemicals
Agricult. Agricult. Petrol
EU15 Renting & Other Bus. Renting & Other Bus. Renting & Other Bus.
Fin Intermed. Fin Intermed. Fin Intermed.
Wholesale Equipments Elect.
Notes: The dominant sectors are given by the estimators of δmax proposed by Pesaran and
Yang (2016). The sectors with top three values of δi are presented in the Table. The in-
dustries featured in this table are: Renting of Machinery & Equipment and Other Business
Services; Financial Intermediation; Machinery, Electrical, Optical, Transport Equipment,
Manufacturing, Recycling; Other Supporting and Auxiliary Transport Activities, Activities
of Travel Agencies; Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing; Wholesale Trade and Com-
mission Trade; Real Estate Activities; Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel; Chemi-
cals and Chemical Products; Electricity, Gas and Water Supply.
Table A2: Tail estimations (η), all countries
With Trade Without Trade
Country 1995 – 2014 1995 – 2007 2008 – 2014 1995 – 2014 1995 – 2007 2008 – 2014
Australia 1.720 1.752 1.665 1.659 1.721 1.559
(0.12) (0.18) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04)
Continued on next page
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Table A2 – Continued from previous page
With Trade Without Trade
Country 1995 – 2014 1995 – 2007 2008 – 2014 1995 – 2014 1995 – 2007 2008 – 2014
Austria 1.665 1.732 1.553 1.651 1.759 1.482
(0.05) (0.07) (0.02) (0.06) (0.09) (0.03)
Belgium 1.540 1.563 1.499 1.266 1.428 1.199
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Bulgaria 2.306 2.324 2.273 2.110 2.139 2.058
(0.19) (0.27) (0.11) (0.22) (0.32) (0.06)
Brazil 1.578 1.627 1.495 1.895 1.959 1.787
(0.05) (0.07) (0.01) (0.07) (0.10) (0.02)
Canada 1.814 1.929 1.633 1.805 1.864 1.774
(0.13) (0.18) (0.04) (0.08) (0.11) (0.03)
China 1.575 1.510 1.710 2.205 2.067 2.415
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.13) (0.15) (0.06)
Cyprus 1.886 1.901 1.857 1.706 1.691 1.730
(0.15) (0.20) (0.05) (0.21) (0.29) (0.08)
Czech Rep. 1.938 1.981 1.864 2.124 2.195 2.003
(0.06) (0.09) (0.04) (0.15) (0.21) (0.10)
Germany 1.447 1.436 1.469 1.518 1.511 1.531
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Denmark 1.843 1.911 1.729 1.531 1.587 1.430
(0.11) (0.16) (0.02) (0.13) (0.19) (0.10)
Spain 1.806 1.876 1.690 2.176 2.300 1.978
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10)
Estonia 1.881 1.989 1.708 1.883 2.072 1.610
(0.05) (0.08) (0.02) (0.10) (0.13) (0.10)
Finland 1.874 2.004 1.673 2.309 2.469 2.062
(0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.07) (0.10) (0.05)
France 1.475 1.520 1.397 1.241 1.391 1.032
(0.08) (0.05) (0.12) (0.31) (0.06) (0.54)
UK 1.614 1.651 1.549 1.455 1.476 1.418
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
Greece 1.565 1.634 1.399 1.545 1.653 1.358
(0.07) (0.10) (0.03) (0.11) (0.17) (0.05)
Hungary 1.487 1.472 1.514 1.588 1.617 1.539
(0.06) (0.08) (0.04) (0.09) (0.12) (0.07)
Indonesia 2.322 2.352 2.105 2.628 2.438 2.684
(0.22) (0.31) (0.10) (0.48) (0.63) (0.12)
India 1.650 1.681 1.594 1.549 1.773 1.226
(0.14) (0.20) (0.03) (0.54) (0.68) (0.56)
Ireland 1.389 1.531 1.185 1.369 1.535 1.291
(0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.09) (0.13) (0.11)
Continued on next page
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With Trade Without Trade
Country 1995 – 2014 1995 – 2007 2008 – 2014 1995 – 2014 1995 – 2007 2008 – 2014
Italy 1.493 1.533 1.423 1.408 1.449 1.337
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
Japan 2.072 2.092 2.037 2.079 2.146 1.965
(0.17) (0.24) (0.02) (0.05) (0.07) (0.02)
South Korea 1.718 1.775 1.621 1.806 1.848 1.733
(0.09) (0.13) (0.04) (0.26) (0.41) (0.07)
Lithuania 1.905 1.919 1.881 2.124 2.018 1.881
(0.06) (0.09) (0.03) (0.15) (0.19) (0.08)
Luxembourg 1.370 1.415 1.293 1.287 1.294 1.276
(0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.08) (0.11) (0.06)
Latvia 1.854 1.993 1.641 1.528 1.499 1.587
(0.09) (0.16) (0.03) (0.43) (0.58) (0.11)
Mexico 1.126 1.179 1.041 1.266 1.313 1.211
(0.06) (0.10) (0.01) (0.04) (0.07) (0.03)
Malta 1.709 1.628 1.883 1.835 1.777 1.914
(0.20) (0.22) (0.07) (0.19) (0.24) (0.15)
Netherlands 1.433 1.449 1.405 1.374 1.402 1.325
(0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.16)
Poland 1.984 2.072 1.839 2.220 2.328 2.040
(0.11) (0.16) (0.06) (0.15) (0.23) (0.09)
Portugal 1.707 1.737 1.652 1.924 1.980 1.827
(0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.08) (0.03)
Romania 1.913 1.898 1.621 1.993 2.032 1.675
(0.15) (0.20) (0.06) (0.10) (0.12) (0.09)
Russia 1.665 1.649 1.696 1.893 1.859 1.960
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04)
Slovakia 2.045 2.089 1.882 1.945 1.971 1.836
(0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.13) (0.16) (0.14)
Slovenia 1.646 1.672 1.600 1.752 1.803 1.664
(0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.05) (0.07) (0.02)
Sweden 1.554 1.596 1.482 1.628 1.691 1.522
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Turkey 2.172 2.078 1.905 2.729 2.721 2.260
(0.14) (0.19) (0.05) (0.17) (0.22) (0.06)
Taiwan 1.914 1.884 1.916 1.734 1.763 1.677
(0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11)
USA 1.488 1.512 1.443 1.473 1.501 1.424
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
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